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We compare the performance of various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems using a novel
single-photon detector, which combines frequency up-conversion in a periodically poled lithium nio-
bate (PPLN) waveguide and a silicon avalanche photodiode (APD). The comparison is based on the
secure communication rate as a function of distance for three QKD protocols: the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84), the Bennett, Brassard, and Mermin 1992 (BBM92), and the coherent differential
phase shift keying (DPSK). We show that the up-conversion detector allows for higher communica-
tion rates and longer communication distances than the commonly used InGaAs/InP APD for all
the three QKD protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd; 42.65.-k
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
to share an unconditionally secure secret key. Security
is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics, ensur-
ing that the key can be used afterwards to encrypt and
decrypt secret messages as a one-time pad. The most
common QKD protocols, which have been implemented
in experiments over the last years [1], are the BB84 pro-
tocol, which uses single photons as information carriers
[2], and the entanglement-based BBM92 protocol [3]. A
security analysis for these protocols under realistic sys-
tem parameters and against individual attacks has been
performed [4, 5]. This analysis shows that the perfor-
mance of a quantum cryptography system, in terms of
communication distance and secure communication rate,
is determined by the characteristics of the source of single
or entangled photons, and of the single-photon detectors.
In addition to the BB84 and BBM92 protocols, we con-
sider the recently proposed differential phase shift keying
(DPSK) protocol, which uses a weak coherent pulse train
as the information carrier [6, 7]. To this end, we develop a
security analysis against certain types of hybrid attacks.
To date, fiber-optic QKD systems have invariably used
InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APDs) as single-
photon detectors. Recently, an alternative technology for
very efficient single-photon detection at 1.55 µm, based
on the principle of frequency up-conversion, was pre-
sented [8]. Using realistic experimental parameters, we
perform comparisons for the various types of sources and
protocols, and show that longer communication distances
and higher communication rates can be achieved using
the up-conversion detector in all cases.
∗Electronic address: ediam@stanford.edu
II. 1.55 µm SINGLE-PHOTON DETECTORS
A. InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiode
The InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes have been the
subject of thorough investigation over the last decade
due to their importance as single-photon detectors in
fiber-optic QKD implementations. Although consider-
able progress has been achieved in the performance of
these detectors [9, 10, 11, 12, 13], they exhibit low quan-
tum efficiencies (typically on the order of 0.1), and, most
seriously, they suffer from after-pulse effects caused by
trapped charge carriers, which produce large dark count
rates during a relatively long time. The high dark count
probability imposes gated-mode operation, which limits
their capabilities significantly. In particular, when op-
erated in gated mode, the APD device is raised above
breakdown threshold for a few nsec, which ensures low
probability of a dark count and high efficiency for de-
tecting light. Subsequently, the device is returned to be-
low breakdown for a time long enough for any trapped
charge carrier to leak away. Given that the trapping
lifetime is on the order of a µsec, this mode allows oper-
ation at MHz rates, while the after-pulse probability is
reduced by the ratio of the gate width to the time separa-
tion between gates. In a QKD application, this gate fre-
quency determines the repetition rate of the signal pulse
and, therefore, limits the attainable communication rate.
Furthermore, the dark count rate, which is critical for
the communication distance, is determined by the gate
width, limited by the response time of the semiconductor
material. Typically, gate widths of 1−2 nsec at ∼ 1 MHz
repetition frequency are used with resulting dark count
rates on the order of 104/sec.
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FIG. 1: Quantum efficiency of the 1.55 µm up-conversion
single photon detector as a function of pump power. The
expression for the fitting curve is given by Eq. (1).
B. Up-conversion detector
In the 1.55 µm up-conversion single-photon detector
[8], a single photon at 1.55 µm interacts with a strong
pump at 1.32 µm in a periodically poled lithium niobate
(PPLN) waveguide, designed for sum-frequency genera-
tion at these wavelengths [14]. Due to the quasi-phase-
matching and the tight mode confinement over long in-
teraction lengths achieved in a guided-wave structure,
this device allows for very high conversion efficiency of
the signal to the ∼ 0.7 µm sum frequency output. The
converted photon is subsequently detected by a silicon
APD. Contrary to InGaAs/InP APDs, Si APDs have
high quantum efficiencies in the near-infrared (typically
on the order of 0.6 − 0.7), very low dark count rates,
and very small after-pulse effects. The last character-
istic enables Geiger (non-gated) mode operation of the
Si APD, which does not impose any severe limitation to
the attainable communication rate in a QKD system. In
practice, however, the rate is limited by the dead time of
Si APD detectors, which is on the order of 50 nsec for
commercial devices. During this time period that follows
a photo-detection event, the photodiode cannot respond
to subsequent events, and, eventually, a very large pho-
ton flux saturates the device. This effect is taken into
account in the calculations of Section IV.
The main characteristics of the up-conversion detec-
tor, such as the quantum efficiency, ηup, and the dark
count rate, Dup, depend on the pump power, p [8]. When
the phase-matching condition in the waveguide is met
and sufficient pump power is available to achieve almost
100% photon conversion, a maximum overall quantum
efficiency of 0.46 is achieved, as shown in Fig. 1. In agree-
ment with the coupled mode theory for three-wave inter-
actions in a waveguide, which predicts a sin2 dependence
of ηup on p, the fitting curve of the experimental results
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FIG. 2: Dark count rate of the 1.55 µm up-conversion single
photon detector as a function of pump power. The expression
for the fitting curve is given by Eq. (2).
is given by the following expression:
ηup(p) = a1 sin
2 (
√
a2p) (1)
where a1 = 0.465, a2 = 79.75, and p is given in mW.
On the other hand, the dark count rate is domi-
nated by a combined nonlinear process: Initially, the
pump photons are scattered by the phonons of both
the PPLN waveguide and the fiber via a spontaneous
Raman scattering process. This process scales linearly
with the pump power, and generates a spectrum of
Stokes photons, which includes the signal wavelength
of 1.55 µm. Subsequently, the noise photons interact
with the pump photons in the waveguide via the phase-
matched sum-frequency generation process, and create
dark counts. The combined process results in an approx-
imately quadratic dependence of the dark counts on the
pump power, as shown in Fig. 2. A more accurate poly-
nomial fitting curve is given by the following expression:
Dup(p) = b0 + b1p+ b2p
2 + b3p
3 + b4p
4 (/sec) (2)
where b0 = 50, b1 = 826.4, b2 = 110.3, b3 = −0.403,
b4 = 0.00065, and p is again given in mW.
An important feature of the up-conversion detector
stems from the fact that the dark counts depend on
optical filter
bit rate B up-converter bandwidth B Si APD
1/B
FIG. 3: Ideal communication system employing an up-
conversion detector.
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FIG. 4: Dark counts per time window/gate for the up-
conversion single-photon detector operating at the minimum
NEP regime, and a typical InGaAs/InP APD respectively, in
the communication system described in Fig. 3.
the bandwidth of the waveguide, as this determines the
number of noise photons. We can define a quantity,
Dup-Hz =
Dup
Bd
(sec−1Hz−1), for a detector with band-
width Bd, which corresponds to the dark counts per
mode. Then, we can think of the ideal communication
system shown in Fig. 3 with a matched filter with band-
width equal to the bit rate B. In such a system, the dark
counts per time window, dup, a parameter of great im-
portance in QKD applications, is equal to Dup-Hz. Note
that dup is independent of the bit rateB (or measurement
time window 1/B) under this optimum filtering. An In-
GaAs/InP APD operated in gated mode has dark counts
per gate, dAPD, calculated by DAPD
1
B , where DAPD
(/sec) is the dark count rate of the InGaAs/InP APD. In
Fig. 4, the quantity d is plotted for the two types of de-
tectors as a function of the bit rate. For the InGaAs/InP
APD, the typical value DAPD = 10
4/sec is used. For the
up-conversion detector, we calculate the quantity Dup-Hz
at the operating point of the detector, where the nor-
malized Noise Equivalent Power (NEP),
√
2D/η, is mini-
mized, which corresponds to Dup = 6.4 × 103/sec and
ηup = 0.075. Given a bandwidth of Bd = 50 GHz
for the up-converter, we find that the optimum dup is
∼ 1.3 × 10−7, as shown in Fig. 4. This result illustrates
the significant advantage of the up-conversion detector
for most practical system bit rates.
The dependence of the dark counts on the waveguide
bandwidth, together with the non-gated mode operation
of the Si APD and the pump power dependence of the
detector characteristics, have a significant effect on the
performance of a quantum cryptography system employ-
ing up-conversion detectors, as we will see in the following
sections.
III. COMMUNICATION RATE EQUATIONS
In this paper, we will consider only individual attacks,
that is Eve is restricted to attack only individual bits;
she is not allowed to perform a coherent attack consist-
ing of collective quantum operations and measurements
of many qubits with quantum computers. In a QKD sys-
tem, the raw transmission of random bits is followed by
a public exchange of information on the time of single-
photon detection and the bases used by the two parties,
which results in the sifted key. The steps of classical
error-correction and privacy amplification follow. The
first step serves the dual purpose of correcting all erro-
neously received bits and giving an estimate of the er-
ror rate. Privacy amplification is then used to distill a
shorter key, the final key, which can be made as secure as
desired. The security analyses of [4, 5] take all the above
steps into account and derive the communication rate
equations that are re-stated in Sections III A and III B.
In Section III C, we derive the corresponding equation
for the DPSK protocol, based on the security analysis
against certain types of hybrid attacks.
A. BB84 protocol
In the BB84 protocol, Alice sends Bob single photons
randomly modulated in two non-orthogonal bases. Bob
measures the polarization states of the single photons in
a randomly chosen polarization basis. The secure com-
munication rate of this protocol against an arbitrary in-
dividual attack, including the most commonly considered
intercept-resend and photon-number splitting (PNS) at-
tacks [4], is given by the following expression:
RBB84 =
1
2
νpclick{τ(e, β) + f(e)[e log2 e+
(1− e) log2(1− e)]} (3)
In the above equation, the factor 12 is called the sifting
parameter and is due to the fact that half of the times
Alice’s and Bob’s polarization bases are not the same.
The repetition rate of the transmission is given by ν.
The probability that Bob detects a photon is
pclick = psignal + pdark (4)
Simultaneous signal and dark counts are ignored in the
above expression, and the two components are given by
psignal = µη10
−(αL+Lr)/10 (5)
pdark = 4d (6)
where µ is the average number of photons per pulse, η the
quantum efficiency of the detector, α the loss coefficient
of the optical fiber in dB/km, L the distance in km, Lr
the loss of the receiver unit in dB, and d the dark counts
per measurement time window of the system. The coef-
ficient 4 in Eq. (6) is due to the assumption of a passive
4TABLE I: Benchmark performance of the error-correction al-
gorithm given in [15].
e f(e)
0.01 1.16
0.05 1.16
0.1 1.22
0.15 1.35
detection unit involving four detectors at Bob’s site, as
in [5]. For an ideal single-photon source, µ = 1, while
for a Poisson source, which corresponds to the common
weak laser pulse implementations [1], µ becomes a free
variable which should be optimized.
The error rate is given by the expression:
e =
1
2pdark + bpsignal
pclick
(7)
where b is the baseline system error rate, which cannot be
distinguished from tampering. The last term in Eq. (3)
corresponds to the additional shrinking of the sifted key
due to the leakage of information to Eve during classical
error correction. The function f(e) depends on the error-
correction algorithm and its values are given in Table I
for the bi-directional algorithm developed in [15].
Finally, the main shrinking factor τ(e, β) in the privacy
amplification step is related through the expression
τ = − log2 pc (8)
to the average collision probability, pc. This is a measure
of Eve’s mutual information with Alice and Bob. In [4]
the following result is derived for τ :
τ(e, β) = −β log2
[
1
2
+ 2
e
β
− 2
(
e
β
)2]
(9)
The parameter β is defined as the fraction of single-
photon states emitted by the source:
β =
pclick − pm
pclick
(10)
where pm is the probability that the source emits a multi-
photon state. For an ideal single-photon source, pm = 0
(i.e., β = 1), while for a Poisson source,
pm = 1− (1 + µ)e−µ (11)
Essentially, the parameter β accounts for the PNS at-
tacks, with which Eve can obtain full information with-
out causing any error in the communication between Al-
ice and Bob by performing a quantum non-demolition
(QND) measurement of the photon number in each pulse,
keeping one photon in her quantum memory when she
detects multiple photons, and applying a delayed mea-
surement on her photon after the public announcement
of the bases by Bob. This attack is a major restricting
factor in the performance of a weak laser pulse imple-
mentation of the BB84 protocol. The secure communica-
tion rate decreases quadratically with the transmission of
the quantum channel, 10−αL/10, for small error rate and
pdark ≪ psignal ≪ 1. On the contrary, for an ideal single-
photon source implementation, under the same condi-
tions we find RBB84 ≈ 12νpsignal, i.e., the rate decreases
only linearly with the fiber transmission.
The above security analysis is based on the assump-
tion that Eve has a quantum memory with an infinitely
long coherence time because Alice and Bob can delay the
public announcement for an arbitrarily long time. If Eve
is not equipped with such a quantum memory, she must
perform the polarization measurement with a randomly
chosen basis. In this realistic case, Eq. (9) must be mod-
ified to:
τ(e, β) = −1 + β
2
log2
[
1
2
+ 4
e
1 + β
− 8
(
e
1 + β
)2]
(12)
B. BBM92 protocol
The BBM92 protocol is the two-photon variant of
BB84. Alice and Bob each share a photon of an en-
tangled photon-pair, for which they measure the polar-
ization state in a randomly-chosen basis out of two non-
orthogonal bases. It was shown in [5] that the average
collision probability, pc, for this protocol is the same as
that of the BB84 with a single-photon source, i.e., with
β = 1. The shrinking factor τ becomes:
τ(e) = − log2
[
1
2
+ 2e− 2e2
]
(13)
This indicates that there is no analog to a photon-number
splitting attack in BBM92. In general, the nature of
this entanglement-based protocol renders it more robust
than BB84; for example it is less vulnerable to errors
caused by dark counts, since one dark count alone cannot
produce an error in this protocol. The equation for the
secure communication rate against any individual attack
is given by the following expression [5]:
RBBM92 =
1
2
νpcoin{τ(e) + f(e)[e log2 e+
(1− e) log2(1 − e)]} (14)
The sifting parameter is the same as in BB84, while the
probability of a coincidence between Alice and Bob is
pcoin = ptrue + pfalse (15)
The expressions for the probability of a true coincidence,
ptrue, and the probability of a false coincidence, pfalse, are
different for a deterministic entangled-photon source and
a Poissonian entangled-photon source, such as a paramet-
ric down converter (PDC). They are given below, under
5the assumption that the source is placed halfway between
the two parties [5].
1. Deterministic entangled-photon source
ptrue = η
210−(αL+2Lr)/10 (16)
pfalse = 8dη10
−(αL+2Lr)/20 + 16d2 (17)
2. Poissonian entangled-photon source
ptrue = c1 (18)
pfalse = 16d
2c2 + 8dc3 + c4 (19)
where
c1 =
1
cosh4 χ
2t2L tanh
2 χ[
1− tanh2 χ(1− tL)2
]4 (20)
c2 =
1
cosh4 χ
1[
1− tanh2 χ(1− tL)2
]2 (21)
c3 =
1
cosh4 χ
2tL(1 − tL) tanh2 χ[
1− tanh2 χ(1− tL)2
]3 (22)
c4 =
1
cosh4 χ
4t2L(1− tL)2 tanh4 χ[
1− tanh2 χ(1− tL)2
]4 (23)
and
tL = η10
−(αL+2Lr)/20 (24)
All the parameters in the above equations are defined
as in the previous section. The parameter χ, which
appears in the case of the Poissonian entangled-photon
source, is a free variable that depends on the average
photon-pair number per pulse, i.e. the nonlinear coeffi-
cient, the pump energy and the interaction time of the
down conversion process. Finally, the error rate is given
by the expression:
e =
1
2pfalse + bptrue
pcoin
(25)
For small error rate and pfalse ≪ ptrue, the secure com-
munication rate of BBM92 decreases linearly with the
transmission of the quantum channel, similarly to the
case of the BB84 protocol with a single photon source.
Note that Eve does not need a quantum memory to at-
tack the BBM92 protocol. Equation (14) is solely deter-
mined by the intercept and resend attack.
C. DPSK protocol
Instead of using two non-orthogonal bases as in BB84
and BBM92, the differential phase shift keying (DPSK)
protocol uses many non-orthogonal states consisting of
many pulses [6, 7]. In particular, it is based on the fact
that highly attenuated coherent states of many pulses
Alice Bob
PM ATT DET1 (0)
{0,B}
DET2 (1)
0 p 0 0
coherent
pulse source
N´J
BS
channel
FIG. 5: Configuration of the DPSK protocol. PM: phase
modulator, ATT: attenuator, BS: beam-splitter, DET: detec-
tor.
with random {0, pi} phase modulation are mutually non-
orthogonal. The idea of encoding the information in the
phase of highly attenuated coherent pulses was first pre-
sented by Bennett in 1992 [16]. The DPSK protocol is
a simpler but more efficient protocol compared to the
B92 protocol. A similar protocol has also recently been
proposed [17].
In the DPSK protocol, shown in Fig. 5, all pulses
are highly attenuated and randomly phase-modulated by
{0, pi}. Each photon coherently spreads over many pulses
with a fixed phase modulation pattern. In the receiver
side, Bob randomly modulates the delay time N × τ in
his interferometer by randomly choosing a positive inte-
ger N , as shown in Fig. 5, where τ is the inverse of the
clock frequency. After passing through Bob’s interferom-
eter, the pulses interfere at Bob’s output beam-splitter,
and which detector clicks depends on the phase differ-
ence of the two pulses separated by a time N × τ . Bob
announces publicly the time instances at which a photon
was detected and the randomly chosen positive integer
N . From her modulation data Alice knows which de-
tector recorded the event. Thus, they form a secret key
by assigning a bit value to each detector. The shifting
parameter is 1 since all bits are utilized during the key
formation.
The security of the DPSK protocol stems from the fact
that the information is encoded on the differential phase
of two nonlocal pulses. This renders the protocol robust
against any type of individual photon splitting attack
[18, 19]. In order to derive the communication rate
equation, we need to calculate the privacy amplification
shrinking factor, τ , defined in Eq. (8) as a function of
the average collision probability, pc. Our analysis takes
into account a hybrid attack, which consists of two types
of collective attacks:
1. Beam-splitter attack
Eve uses a beam-splitter with transmission ηBS to ob-
tain coherent copies of the quantum state of many pulses
that Alice sends to Bob. She also replaces the lossy opti-
cal fiber with a loss-less one, and the inefficient detectors
at Bob’s receiver unit with ideal ones. Without Eve’s
intervention, Bob’s probability of detecting a signal pho-
ton, psignal, is identical to the one given in Eq. (5). In
order to leave this probability unaltered, Eve has to set
6the beam-splitter transmission, ηBS, to:
ηBS = η10
−(αL+Lr)/10 (26)
where all the parameters are defined as in Section IIIA.
One possibility for Eve is to measure the pulses that she
picks up with an interferometer with delay time M × τ
chosen independently from Bob’s. In this case, her in-
formation gain is calculated as follows: the probabil-
ity of a detection event at Eve’s and Bob’s site at a
given time slot is given by µ(1 − ηBS) and µηBS respec-
tively, where µ is the average number of photons per
pulse. Thus, the probability of a detection event at the
same time instance is equal to µ2ηBS(1 − ηBS). On the
other hand, the probability that Eve’s randomly chosen
M matches Bob’s N is equal to 1/N . Then, the prob-
ability that Eve gains bit information relative to Bob
is µ2ηBS(1 − ηBS)/(µηBSN) = µ(1 − ηBS)/N . This is
true if we assume that Eve is not equipped with a quan-
tum memory with an infinitely long coherence time or
if Alice and Bob encrypt their public channel commu-
nication. However, if we allow Eve to have a quantum
memory and the two parties do not encrypt their public
exchange of information, Eve’s strategy can be changed
in order to increase her information gain. In this case,
she keeps the pulses in her quantum memory and waits
for Bob’s announcement. Note that Alice and Bob can
delay the public announcement for an arbitrarily long
time, so Eve’s quantum memory must have an infinitely
long coherence time. Then, Eve uses an optical interfer-
ometer with an active switch that allows her to interfere
only the pulses for which she is aware that Bob has ob-
tained the differential phase information. This strategy
increases Eve’s probability of gaining bit information to
2µ(1 − ηBS). The beam-splitter attack does not cause
any error in the communication between Alice and Bob,
hence it gives full information, i.e., pc = 1, to Eve for
a fraction of bits equal to µ(1 − ηBS)/N or 2µ(1 − ηBS).
The remaining fraction of the bits is given by:
γ =


1− µ(1−ηBS)N = 1− µN +
psignal
N
:without quantum memory
1− 2µ(1− ηBS) = 1− 2µ+ 2psignal
:with quantum memory
(27)
2. Intercept-resend attack
Eve also applies an intercept and resend attack to
some of the pulses that are sent to Bob after her beam
splitter. In particular, Eve intercepts two pulses with
a time interval M × τ , lets them pass through an
interferometer with an identical delay M × τ , measures
the differential phase, and according to her measurement
result she sends an appropriate state to Bob. We assume
that in the case of an inconclusive or vacuum outcome
she sends the vacuum state, while when she measures a
single photon she sends a photon split into two pulses
with the correct phase difference applied between them.
In this case, when Bob picks up an identical delay,
N =M , and measures the central time slot, he does not
detect the eavesdropping because he obtains the correct
answer. However, with probability 1 − 12N he chooses
another delay, N 6= M , or measures the side time slots,
which yield random, uncorrelated results, and with
probability 12 these lead in error. Hence, this attack
causes a bit error of 12
(
1− 12N
)
in the communication
between Alice and Bob. If the error rate of the system is
e, Eve is allowed to apply her attack to a fraction 2e1−1/2N
of the pulse-pairs in order not to exceed this error rate.
With probability 12N , she obtains full information for
these intercepted pulse-pairs.
In summary, taking into account the hybrid attack
consisting of the beam-splitter and intercept-resend at-
tacks, we find that the fraction of bits for which Eve
has no information, i.e., for which pc =
1
2 , is equal to
γ − eN(1−1/2N) . Thus, we have calculated the privacy
amplification shrinking factor,
τ(e, γ) = γ − e
N
(
1− 12N
) (28)
where γ is given by Eq. (27). We can now write the
equation for the secure communication rate of the DPSK
protocol against the hybrid attack we considered:
RDPSK = νpclick{τ(e, γ) + f(e)[e log2 e+
(1− e) log2(1− e)]} (29)
In the above equation, ν is the repetition rate of the
transmission. The probability that Bob detects a photon,
pclick, is defined in Eq. (4). The probability of a signal
count, psignal, is given by Eq. (5), while the probability of
a dark count, pdark, in this case is given by the expression:
pdark = 2d (30)
because there are two detectors at the receiver unit. Fi-
nally, the error rate is defined in Eq. (7), and the values
of f(e) are given in Table I.
In the case of small error rate and pdark ≪ psignal ≪ 1,
Eq. (29) gives RDPSK ≈ ν(1− µN )psignal without a quan-
tum memory, or RDPSK ≈ ν(1 − 2µ)psignal with a quan-
tum memory. This means that the secure rate for the
DPSK protocol decreases linearly with the fiber trans-
mission. This is in agreement with the results of [17] and
[20], who have considered a protocol similar to DPSK
and a slightly modified B92 protocol respectively.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We compare the performance of quantum key distribu-
tion systems implementing the BB84, BBM92 and DPSK
protocols, when the up-conversion single-photon detec-
tor is used. In order to do that, we calculate the secure
7communication rate as a function of distance for fiber-
optic implementations of the three protocols, based on
Eqs. (3),(14) and (29) respectively. In the case of BB84
and BBM92, both ideal and realistic sources of single and
entangled photons are considered. Some parameters are
fixed in all simulations: the channel loss is set to α = 0.2
dB/km at 1.55 µm, the baseline system error rate is set
to b = 0.01, and in addition to the fiber losses we assume
an extra loss of Lr = 1 dB at the receiver site. As men-
tioned in Section IIIA, in the case of a weak laser pulse
implementation of the BB84 protocol, the average num-
ber of photons per pulse, µ, is an adjustable parameter,
with respect to which the rate is numerically optimized at
each distance. Intuitively, such optimization is necessary
because when this parameter is too low the dark counts
dominate, while when it is too high the probability of
multi-photon pulses becomes very large. In both cases,
secure communication quickly becomes impossible. The
corresponding adjustable parameter is χ in the case of
the BBM92 protocol with a Poissonian entangled-photon
source.
It is clear from the analysis of Section III that the
critical parameters for the performance of a quantum
cryptography system related to the single-photon detec-
tor employed are the dark counts per measurement time
window, d, the quantum efficiency, η, and the repetition
rate of the transmission that it allows, ν. In the case
of the up-conversion single-photon detector, due to the
non-gated mode operation of the Si APD there is no se-
vere limitation to the repetition rate of the experiment.
In practice, the limit is set by the speed of the electronic
equipment as well as by the timing jitter of the Si APD
(typically 0.5 − 0.7 nsec). A realistic value, compatible
with currently available components, is νup = 1 GHz. As
was explained in Section II B, the limiting factor for the
attainable communication rate is the dead time of the
Si APD, td. Assuming that the photo-detection events
follow a Poisson process, the probability of two events oc-
curring in a time period larger than td is given by the ex-
ponential factor e−δνpclicktd , where δ depends on the num-
ber of detectors in the receiver unit. For the typical value
td = 50 nsec, this saturation factor becomes rather small
at rates greater than a few MHz, limiting the final rate at
small fiber losses. Using Eqs. (1) and (2), we numerically
optimize the communication rate for each protocol with
respect to the pump power, p, at each distance. Such
optimization is intuitively necessary because depending
on the communication distance an equilibrium between
the values of the quantum efficiency and the dark counts
of the up-conversion detector has to be established. The
result of this optimization indicates the optimal regime
of operation of the detector at each distance. Finally,
the optimum filtering configuration, shown in Fig. 3, is
assumed, which sets the measurement time window to 1
nsec.
The simulation results are shown in Figs. 6, 7, and 8
for the BB84, BBM92, and DPSK protocols respectively.
Each curve features a cut-off distance, which is due to
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FIG. 6: Secure communication rate as a function of distance
for the BB84 protocol employing a Poisson or an ideal single-
photon source.
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FIG. 7: Secure communication rate as a function of distance
for the BBM92 protocol employing a Poissonian or a deter-
ministic entangled-photon source.
the increasing contribution of the dark counts with fiber
length. The saturation effect, related to the dead time of
the Si APD, is apparent for small fiber losses and high
bit rates.
In the case of BB84 with a Poisson single-photon
source, we observe in Fig. 6 that not allowing Eve to
possess a quantum memory with an infinitely long co-
herence time does not have a major effect on the per-
formance of the system. The quadratic decrease of the
rate of the communication rate with the fiber length, a
consequence of the PNS attacks, is a dominant factor,
making this implementation unsuitable for long-distance
quantum cryptography. On the contrary, the use of an
ideal single-photon source allows for a significantly longer
communication distance with high communication rates.
80 50 100 150 200 250 300
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
Distance (km)
Co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n 
Ra
te
 (b
its
/se
c)
with memory
without memory − N=1
without memory − N=10
without memory − N=100
FIG. 8: Secure communication rate as a function of distance
for the DPSK protocol employing time delay parameters N
= 1, 10, or 100.
However, such a source does not exist today at 1.55 µm,
although efforts towards this goal are underway [21].
As shown in Fig. 7, the inherently more robust
entanglement-based BBM92 protocol allows for even
longer communication distances, having the capability
to achieve a practical 1 Hz secure key generation rate at
more than 300 km with a deterministic entangled-photon
source. However, technological difficulties related to en-
tanglement generation and coincidence detection at 1.55
µm have limited until today this distance to 30 km [22].
The DPSK protocol features characteristics very sim-
ilar to BB84 with a single-photon source, due to its ro-
bustness to PNS attacks, as was shown in the security
analysis of Section III C. In this case, when a realistic
scenario is assumed, where Eve does not possess a quan-
tum memory with an infinitely long coherence time, or
Alice and Bob encrypt their public communication, we
observe in Fig. 8 a significant effect on the performance of
the system. Indeed, introducing a time delay parameter
N greater than 1 enhances both the secure communica-
tion rate and the communication distance of the system
considerably. Nevertheless, the advantage becomes com-
paratively smaller as N increases to values greater than
10. This result shows that the DPSK protocol is a very
practical and appealing alternative for a long-distance
QKD system, with the potential of 1 kHz secure key gen-
eration rate over distances longer than 200 km.
For all the QKD protocols, if instead of the up-
conversion detector we assume an InGaAs/InP APD
with νAPD = 10 MHz, which is the best gate frequency
achieved to date [9], and the typical values ηAPD = 0.1
and dAPD = 10
−5/gate [17], we find that the maximum
communication distance is about half of the one achieved
with an up-conversion detector, while the communication
rate is two orders of magnitude lower than with the up-
conversion detector, due to the gated-mode operation of
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
Distance (km)
Co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n 
Ra
te
 (b
its
/se
c)
BB84 − Poisson
BB84 − Ideal
BBM92 − Poissonian
BBM92 − Deterministic
DPSK
FIG. 9: Comparison of the performance of QKD systems im-
plementing the BB84, BBM92 and DPSK protocols. An op-
timized up-conversion single-photon detector and Eve’s ideal
quantum memory are assumed in all cases.
the InGaAs/InP APD. Clearly, the up-conversion detec-
tor offers a great advantage over the InGaAs/InP APD
as a single-photon detector in a QKD system, both in
terms of secure communication rate and communication
distance.
Finally, in Fig. 9 we compare the performance of quan-
tum key distribution systems implementing the three
protocols, under the assumptions that Eve is equipped
with an ideal quantum memory and that the dark counts
of the up-conversion detector, caused by parasitic non-
linear processes in the PPLN waveguide, are eliminated.
This means that the detector’s performance is ideally lim-
ited by the Si APD characteristics, which corresponds to
dup = 5 × 10−8. Operation at the maximum quantum
efficiency regime is also assumed, i.e. ηup = 0.46. We
observe that, ultimately, 250 km of secure communica-
tion distance is possible with the DPSK protocol and an
ideal single-photon source implementation of BB84, while
BBM92 has the potential of extending this distance to
350 km with a deterministic entangled-photon source.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the main characteristics of
two types of 1.55 µm single-photon detectors, the In-
GaAs/InP APD and the up-conversion detector, which
combines frequency up-conversion in a PPLN waveguide
and detection by a silicon APD. We presented the com-
munication rate equations for the BB84 and the BBM92
QKD protocols, and we derived a corresponding equa-
tion for the DPSK protocol, developing a security anal-
ysis of this protocol against certain types of hybrid at-
tacks. Based on these equations, we compared the per-
formance of fiber-optic quantum key distribution systems
9employing the protocols under consideration, with re-
alistic experimental parameters. In all cases, we found
that a secure communication rate of two orders of mag-
nitude higher than before is possible, while the use of the
up-conversion detector enables quantum key distribution
over communication distances longer by a factor of 2 than
with an InGaAs/InP APD. Furthermore, the importance
of the implemented protocol was illustrated, and the im-
pact of Eve’s allowed capabilities was investigated. We
concluded that the simple and efficient DPSK protocol
allows for more than 200 km of secure communication
distance with high communication rates, in the realistic
case that Eve does not possess a quantum memory with
an infinitely long coherence time, and the time delay pa-
rameter N is greater than 1. The BBM92 protocol can
extend this distance to 300 km with a reasonably high
secure key generation rate. It is clear that improving the
performance of the Si APDs with respect to their dead
time and timing jitter and reducing the dark counts of
the up-converter will extend the capabilities of fiber-optic
QKD systems employing these protocols even further.
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